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ABSTRACT
International  surveys  reveal  wide  differences  between  the  views  held  in  different  countries
concerning the causes of wealth or poverty and the extent to which people are responsible for their
own fate. At the same time, social ethnographies and experiments by psychologists demonstrate
individuals' recurrent struggle with cognitive dissonance as they seek to maintain, and pass on to
their children, a view of the world where effort ultimately pays off and everyone gets their just
deserts. This paper offers a model that helps explain: i) why most people feel such a need to believe
in a "just world"; ii) why this need, and therefore the prevalence of the belief, varies considerably
across countries; iii) the implications of this phenomenon for international differences in political
ideology, levels of redistribution, labor supply, aggregate income, and popular perceptions of the
poor. The model shows in particular how complementarities arise endogenously between individuals'
desired beliefs or ideological choices, resulting in two equilibria. A first, "American" equilibrium
is characterized by a high prevalence of just-world beliefs among the population and relatively
laissez-faire policies. The other, "European" equilibrium is characterized by more pessimism about
the role of effort in economic outcomes and a more extensive welfare state. More generally, the
paper develops a theory of collective beliefs and motivated cognitions, including those concerning










tirole@cict.fr“Individuals have a need to believe that they live in a world where people generally get what they
deserve.” (M. Lerner, The Belief in a Just World: A Fundamental Delusion (1982)).
1 Introduction
International surveys reveal striking diﬀerences between the views held in diﬀerent countries con-
cerning the causes of economic success or poverty, the extent to which individuals are responsible
for their own fate, and the long-run rewards to personal eﬀort. American “exceptionalism”, as
manifested by the widely professed belief in the American Dream, is but the most striking ex-
ample of this phenomenon. At the same time, ethnographic surveys by sociologists reveal that
working-class and lower-middle-class individuals do not adhere to these views as dispassionate
statisticians. On the contrary, they constantly struggle with the cognitive dissonance required
to maintain (and pass on to their children) the view that eﬀort, hard work, and good deeds will
ultimately bring a better life, that crime does not pay, etc., in spite of recurrent evidence that
life may not be that fair. Similarly, experimental psychologists have documented the fact that
most individuals feel a strong need to believe that they live in a world that is just, in the sense
that people generally get what they deserve, and deserve what they get. When confronted with
data that contradicts this view they try hard to ign o r e ,r e i n t e r p r e t ,d i s t o r t ,o rf o r g e ti t— f o r
instance by ﬁnding imaginary merits to the recipients of fortuitous rewards, or assigning blame
to innocent victims.
This paper proposes a theory of why people may feel such a need to believe in a just world; of
why this need, and therefore the prevalence of the belief, may vary considerably across countries;
and of its implications for redistributive policies and the stigma born by the poor. At the heart of
the model are general-equilibrium interactions between each individual’s psychologically-based
“demand” for a belief in a just world (or similar ideology) and the degree of redistribution chosen
by the polity.
Because of imperfect willpower, people constantly strive to motivate themselves (or their
children) towards eﬀort, educational investment, perseverance in the face of adversity and away
from the slippery slope of idleness, welfare dependency, crime, drugs, etc. In such circumstances,
maintaining somewhat rosy beliefs about the fact that everyone will ultimately get their “just
deserts” can be very valuable. If enough people thus end up with the view that economic success
is highly dependent on eﬀort they will represent a pivotal voting block, and set a low tax rate.
Conversely, when people anticipate that society will carry out little redistribution, the costs of a
deﬁcient motivation to eﬀort or human capital investment are much higher than with high taxes
and a generous safety net. Each individual thus has greater incentives to maintain his belief
that eﬀort ultimately pays, and consequently more voters end up with such a world view.
Due to these complementarities between individuals’ desired beliefs or ideological choices
induced by the political outcome, there can be two equilibria. A ﬁrst, “American” equilibrium
1is characterized by a high prevalence of just-world beliefs among the population (a high degree
of denial of dissonant news), and a relatively laissez-faire public policy. The other, “European”
equilibrium is characterized by more “realistic pessimism” (less denial, leading to a more cynical
majority) and a more extensive welfare state, which in turn reduces the value to individuals of
investing in optimistic beliefs. In this equilibrium there is also less stigma borne by the poor, in
the sense that fewer agents are likely to blame poverty on a lack of eﬀort or willpower. Aggregate
eﬀort and income, however, are also lower.
More generally, this paper proposes a mechanism for the emergence and persistence of col-
lective beliefs and society-wide cognitive distortions. Three other main applications are thus
developed. The ﬁrst concerns perceptions of link between “money and happiness” and the
related dichotomy observed between consumerist and leisurist societies. The second is the af-
fective (anxiety-reducing) dimension of just-world beliefs, which we show can play a similar role
to that of the functional, motivation-related one. The third is religion, that is, beliefs about the
likelihood of an afterlife and the nature of its rewards and punishments.
2 Self-reliance and redistribution: views from economics, soci-
ology and psychology
Why is the social contract (redistribution through taxes and transfers, unemployment and health
insurance, education ﬁnance and labor market regulation) so diﬀerent across otherwise very
comparable societies, such as the United States and Europe? More generally, what are the
forces that limit the extent of redistribution in a democracy, preventing the poor majority from
“soaking the rich”?
1. Economists. Economists have explored three types of explanations for these puzzles. The
ﬁrst one emphasizes diﬀerences in beliefs about the costs and beneﬁts of redistribution or the true
determinants of earnings and social mobility (Hirschman (1973), Piketty (1995, 1998), Bénabou
and Ok (2001), Rotemberg (2002), Fong (2001), Alesina and La Ferrara (2001)). The present
paper directly relates to this literature but with a new, explicitly psychological perspective on the
formation of beliefs. A second strand of work stresses history-dependence in the joint dynamics
of the income distribution and redistributive policies, from which welfare states and laissez-faire
societies arise as multiple steady-states under common politico-economic fundamentals (Bénabou
(2000, 2004), Saint-Paul (2001), Hassler et al. (2002), Desdoigts and Moizeau (2004)). Finally, a
third line of explanation invokes historical diﬀerences in political institutions (e.g., a centralized
versus a federal state, proportional versus majoritarian representation) or, given that institutions
are ultimately also chosen, points to exogenous sources of variation in political “technology” or
preferences, such as land area or ethnic heterogeneity (Alesina, Glaeser and Sacerdote (2001),
Alesina and Glaeser (2004)).
2Figure 1: Beliefs and policies (source: Alesina, Glaser and Sacerdote (2001))
While diﬀerences in beliefs are thus not required to explain divergent social contracts, consid-
erable evidence suggests that citizens’ attitudes with respect to the sources of wealth or poverty
(self-reliance versus societal factors) do play a major role. Data from the World Values Survey
(Alesina et al. (2001), Keely (2002)) show that only 29% of Americans believe that the poor are
t r a p p e di np o v e r t ya n do n l y30% that luck, rather than eﬀort or education, determines income.
The ﬁgures for Europeans are nearly double: 60% and 54% respectively. Similarly, Americans
are about twice as likely as Europeans to think that the poor “are lazy or lack willpower” (60%
versus 26%) and that “in the long run, hard work usually brings a better life” (59% versus
34-43%; Ladd and Bowman (2001)). Large diﬀerences in attitudes also exist within Europe, es-
pecially between OECD and Eastern European countries (Suhrcke (2001)). While it is not clear
whether interviewees answer questions in a “pretax” or “posttax” sense —that is, whether they
are describing the functioning of the market, the state, or both (our model will in fact highlight
the interaction of these two perceptions), such enormous diﬀerences cannot be ignored.
This is all the more true since, as shown on Figure 1 (reproduced from Alesina et al. (2001))
there is a strong correlation between such beliefs and actual redistributive policies. The standard
interpretation of this relationship is one where popular beliefs determine policy outcomes, and
indeed it is the case that individual voters’ beliefs about the extent to which people control
their own fate are major determinants of their attitudes towards inequality and redistribution
—swamping in particular the eﬀects of own income and education (Fong (2001)). But it could
also be that the nature of the social contract shapes people’s beliefs, and our model will in fact
emphasize that causality runs in both directions. In any case, one needs to explain the sources
3of the variations observed across advanced democracies in people’s perceptions of how the world
functions.
The traditional Marxist view is that workers, especially in America, hold a “false conscious-
ness” about the fairness of market rewards and the prospects of improving their lot through
eﬀort, because they have been so indoctrinated or “brainwashed” by the propaganda of capital-
ists who control education, the media, etc.1 At the other extreme, in a sense, is the learning
theory of Piketty (1995, 1998), where individuals and national populations can get stuck with
incorrect beliefs about the mobility process in a purely “accidental” manner: because learning
about the return to eﬀort is costly, a “bandit problem” arises, leading individual or dynasties
to stop experimenting with diﬀerent levels of eﬀort after a suﬃciently favorable or unfavorable
series of income realizations.
2. Sociologists and political scientists. The evidence from ethnographic surveys, however,
paints a very diﬀerent picture: that of a “false consciousness” that is chosen and valued by the
workers themselves —much like a religion. Lane (1959), Hochschild (1981, 1996) and Lamont
(2000), for instance, conducted hundreds of detailed interviews of both White and Black working
class and lower-middle-class individuals, among whom the mythical median voter presumably
resides. They asked in particular about their views on the determinants of economic success
and poverty as well as their personal “values” and life stories. The ﬁrst major ﬁnding that con-
sistently emerges from this body of work is one of strongly motivated beliefs. These individuals
desperately cling to a belief that eﬀort, hard work, good deeds will ultimately pay oﬀ:p e o p l e
get what they deserve, and conversely, what they get, they must deserve (good or bad). At the
same time, they face daily reminders that the world is not so just, and constantly struggle with
the resulting “cognitive dissonance”. Typical is this statement by Maria, a very poor cleaning
lady interviewed by Hochschild (1996):
“Once, Maria wonders if executives deserve their $60,000 annual salary: «I don’t think they
do all that [much] work, do you? Sit at their desk —they got it easy». But she suppresses the
thought immediately. «Well, maybe it is a lot of work. Maybe they have a lot of writing to do,
or they have to make sure things go right. So maybe they are deserving of it”».2
This kind of cognitive conﬂict and belief manipulation also has an important intergenera-
tional dimension, and both are found at all income and educations levels:
“My mom always told me that hard work, loyalty and respect for others will bring me success,
wrote J. K., who was let go from Credit Suisse in late October. That’s why I came back to CSFB
after business school... and did all that other stuﬀ. Apparently, it doesn’t always work that way.”
(New York Times, December 1st, 2002).
1We take up the issue of propaganda in Section 4.5. A related argument is that of Roemer (1998), who shows
how the introduction of a second issue in the political debate (abortion, crime, gun control, etc.) can eﬀectively
split the coalition of the poor that would otherwise arise to demand high levels of redistribution.
2To perhaps also experience some cognitive dissonance, the reader should update the ﬁgure to $60,000,000 and
think of CEO compensation.
4One can also note at this point the parallel discrepancy that exists between the common and
persistent perception of the United States as an exceptionally mobile society (especially in the
minds of Americans themselves) and the actual evidence on intergenerational income mobility,
which, on average, shows no signiﬁcant diﬀerence with European welfare states.3
The second key ﬁnding of the ethnographic literature on the working poor is the overarching
importance of willpower —what Lamont (2000) terms “the disciplined self”. The main challenge
in the life of the interviewed subjects is the daily struggle to “keep it going,” not give up, and
persevere in the face of adversity. They are frequently reminded, and constantly scared of,
the fate of those who do give up: welfare dependency, homelessness, drugs, etc. The harsh
judgements they pass on the non-working poor and welfare recipients (especially Blacks) reﬂect
their attributing poverty in large part to “giving up”, “not caring”, having “no values”, “no
direction in life”, etc. As summarized by Lane (1959), they express “the general view that
s u c c e s si sat r i u m p ho ft h ew i l la n dar e ﬂection of ability”.4
3. Psychologists. Both of these key ﬁndings of the sociological and ethnographical literatures
—motivated beliefs and weakness of will— are of course closely echoed by psychologists. The
latter relates to the large literature on self-control problems, which in recent years has attracted
increasing attention from economists. The former relates to a nexus of cognitive biases involving
attributions for success and failure, reward and punishment. People are commonly subject
to what Ross and Nisbett (1991) describe as “the fundamental attribution error”, namely an
excessive tendency to explain the behavior and outcomes of others by underlying “dispositions”
(personal attributes) rather than external circumstances or luck. Relatedly, they commonly
display the “illusion of control”, namely an excessive conﬁdence that they, and others, can aﬀect
their own environment and, ultimately, their own fate. Closely related, and most speciﬁct ot h e
issues on which we focus, is what Lerner (1982) called the “Belief in a Just World” (henceforth
BJW), that is, the nearly universal human tendency to want to believe that the world is just,
in the sense that people generally get what they deserve.
Many experiments thus show how individuals systematically construe what they observe so
as to preserve this belief —ignoring, distorting, forgetting or explaining away any information
that threatens it. A typical example involves the reinterpretation of fortuitous rewards, where
subjects ﬁnd imaginary merits and superior performances in the one person in a team whom they
know to have been preselected at random to receive the largest payment. Another well-known set
of experiments shows that when confronted with a person whose suﬀering they can do nothing
to alleviate, many people end up “blaming the victim” —ﬁnding reasons why he brought the
suﬀering on himself— or invoking compensating diﬀerentials (a silver lining). The more extreme
3Some rank somewhat below the United States (cf. Rustichini et al. (1999) on Italy), others quite similarly (cf.
Lefranc and Trannoy (2004) on France), others yet above (cf. Björklund and Jäntti (1997a,b) on Scandinavian
countries or Couch and Dunn (1997) on Germany, who examine both income and education mobility).
4It is also notable that the question about “the poor” in the World Values Survey is whether the respondent
agrees or disagrees that they “are lazy or lack willpower”.
5but nonetheless common case is that of self-blame by the victims themselves. Naturally, diﬀerent
individuals subscribe to diﬀerent degrees to the just-world view, and the scale devised by Peplau
and Tyler (1975) reveals very interesting correlates. High-BJW scorers are more likely to give
stiﬀ sentences to defendants convicted of a crime such as negligent homicide, but also to ﬁnd
victims (e.g., in a rape case) more culpable and “deserving” of their fate. They tend to see the
status quo as desirable, to be politically and economically conservative, to believe in an active
God, and to be less cynical than others. They have a greater tendency to justify the plights
of Blacks and women and a lower propensity to social and political activism. The BJW score
is also correlated with having a Protestant ethic and a strong belief in internal locus of control
(people being responsible for their own fate).5
These ﬁndings lead us to investigate why people should want, or “need”, to believe in a just
world, and to what extent they can succeed in achieving (or imparting their children with) such a
“false consciousness”, if the word is in fact not so just. We then ask why there is such wide cross-
country variations in the extent to which people subscribe to this ideology, and examine some
of the main political economy implications. In line with the experimental and ethnographical
evidence, our theory incorporates : a) a “demand side” for motivated beliefs, arising either from
imperfect willpower (present-biased preferences) or from anticipatory utility, with respect to
this world or the next; b) a “supply side”, taking the form of self-deception via selective recall
or awareness, or that of parental indoctrination; c) general equilibrium interactions between
individuals’ cognitive investments, mediated by the collective policy choice.
This research thus brings together the literature on the political economy of redistribu-
tion and social mobility mentioned earlier, and the recent work in “psychology and economics”
dealing with cognitive dissonance, strategic ignorance, overconﬁdence, self-deception, wishful
thinking and the like (e.g., Akerlof and Dickens (1982), Carrillo and Mariotti (2000), Bénabou
and Tirole (2002, 2004), Köszegi (2000) and Landier (2001)). In stressing the links between
individual beliefs about self-determination and equilibrium redistributive policies, our paper is
also closely related to Piketty (1995, 1998) and to recent work by Esteban and Kranich (2002)
and especially Alesina and Angeletos (2005). These last authors are also concerned with ex-
plaining the coexistence of low- and high-redistribution societies, each associated with diﬀerent
beliefs about the sources of economic disparities. Their model centers on a very diﬀerent mech-
anism, based on concerns of social fairness, and the regimes to which it gives rise correspond
to multiple rational-expectations equilibria for the share of national income inequality that is
due to variations in eﬀort. In our model they correspond instead to divergent yet self-sustaining
perceptions of the same reality —that is, to diﬀerent ideologies.
5We are not aware of international comparisons in the prevalence or intensity with which people subscribe to
the BJW worldview, but Lamont’s (2000) comparative interviews with American and French workers strongly
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Figure 2: Timing of signals and actions
3 A model of ideology
3.1 Technology and preferences
The economy is populated by a continuum of agents,i∈ [0,1], whose actions take place according
to the timeline on Figure 2. Each individual produces period-2 output with the technology
yi =
(
1 with probability πi + θei
0 with probability 1 − (πi + θei)
, (1)
where ei is the level of eﬀort (or human capital investment) he chose in period 1 and πi reﬂects
his social background —resources or social capital inherited from one’s parents, discrimination,
etc.6 For a minority ϕ<1/2 of agents πi takes a high value π1, while for the remaining majority
it is π0 ≤ π1; we shall refer to these two classes as advantaged and disadvantaged, or simply rich
and poor. We let ¯ π ≡ ϕπ1+(1−ϕ)π0 and similarly denote by ¯ e and ¯ y =¯ π+θ¯ e the (endogenous)
average levels of eﬀort and output.
At the start of period 1, agents vote over a linear tax rate τ ≤ 1 that determines how market
incomes will be redistributed in period 2. As there is no reason to exclude regressive policies a
priori, we allow τ<0. Imposing τ ∈ [0,1] would not alter the results.
T h et r u ee x t e n tt ow h i c he ﬀort is rewarded in the long term, θ, is unknown. We shall consider
three possible sources of “demand” for just-world beliefs: functional, aﬀective, and religious. In
this and the next section, demand for a positive outlook on θ will arise endogenously (though not
necessarily consciously) from the fact that it helps motivate oneself, or one’s children, towards
the pursuit of long-term goals. In Section 5 we will show that similar results obtain when people
simply derive comfort from thinking that theyl i v ei naw o r l dw h e r et h ea f t e r t a xr e t u r nt oe ﬀort
is high (because such a world is more “fair” or more predictable), as well as when they are




i + ε (where E [ε]=0 ) , however, except for those in Section 4.4.
7concerned about potential rewards in the afterlife.
We now focus on the motivation-based speciﬁcation, which ﬁts closely with both the ethno-
graphic evidence mentioned earlier and Lerner’s (1982, p.9) opening description of the “belief
in a just world”: “These assumptions... are central to the ability to engage in long-term goal-
directed activity. In order to plan, work for and obtain things they want, and avoid those which
are frightening or painful, people must assume that there are manageable procedures which are
eﬀective in producing the desired states”.
Agents’ preferences are subject, at the time eﬀort is exerted, to a “salience of the present”













where τ is the tax rate he will face in period 2, Ωi
t his date-t information set, β0 ≡ 1 and
β1 ≡ β<1. Due to imperfect willpower (β<1), the eﬀort choice ei will tend to be too low,
compared to the ex-ante desirable level. A formally equivalent interpretation of (2) is that Ui
0
represents parental preferences over their oﬀspring’s level of human capital investment (e.g.,
eﬀort in school), whereas Ui
1 describes the preferences of children themselves.
3.2 Signals and beliefs
At t =0each agent receives a binary signal about the return to eﬀort, θ. For simplicity, we
take these signals to be perfectly correlated, reﬂecting for instance some aggregate information.7
Thus, with probability 1 − q everyone receives bad news, σi = L, a n dw i t hp r o b a b i l i t yq they
receive no news, σi = ∅. This “no news is good news” assumption serves only to simplify the
analysis and is inessential to the main results (see Section 4.2). The expected return to eﬀort in
each state is denoted
θL ≡ E[θ|σ = L] < E[θ|σ = ∅] ≡ θH, (3)
and the diﬀerence is ∆θ ≡ θH − θL. Just after receiving the date-zero signal σi ∈ {L,∅}, agent
i’s information set is Ωi
0. Later on, however, when voting on taxes and choosing eﬀort, he may
no longer be aware of, or reliably recollect, the initial news. Equivalently, his parents may
have learned σi but withheld the information. Agent i’s information set Ωi
1 at t =1is thus
based instead on a recollection (or parental account) of the original signal, which we denote as
ˆ σi ∈ {L,∅}.
Figure 3 describes the cognitive technology through which individuals can (partially) ma-
nipulate their own beliefs, or those of their children, about whether or not the world is “just”.
7The case where they represent conditionally independent draws from a common distribution that depends on
θ leads to similar results. By focusing on exogenous signals, we are also abstracting from the possibility that the
equilibrium tax rate τ may reveal some information about θ. As explained in Section 4.2, however, one can easily
choose parameters so that it does not.
8Formally, the probability
λ ≡ Pr[ˆ σ = L| σ = L] (4)
that any piece of news will later on be recalled can be increased or decreased, at some cost
M(λ). These costs may involve real resources (eliminating hard evidence, avoiding certain
cues and social interactions), time (searching for and rehearsing reassuring information, for
instance through political activism or religious participation), psychic (stress from repression),
or reputational (misleading one’s children, who may eventually ﬁnd out). A typical cost function






























Fig. 3b: The awareness technology
In equilibrium, the optimal recall rate λ will be determined jointly with the political outcome
τ and be the same for all agents. For the moment, the only important features of the belief
mechanism are that: i) λ may be less than 1; ii) individuals are aware, to some extent, that
they and others may have a systematic tendency to see or present the world in a “positive”
light. Consequently, they do not take the absence of adverse recollections (ˆ σi = ∅), or their
parents’ exhortations that eﬀort pays and crime does not, at face value. Instead, they assess the
reliability of a “no bad news” message, ˆ σi = ∅, as
r =
q
q + χ(1 − q)(1 − λ)
≡ r∗(λ|χ), (5)
where λ denotes the rate of information transmission used by everyone in equilibrium. The
parameter χ ∈ [0,1] measures agents’ degree of cognitive sophistication, allowing the model to








when they vote and work are thus µi =0for the λ “pessimists” who recall ˆ σi = L and µi = r
for the 1 − λ (qualiﬁed) “optimists” for whom ˆ σi = ∅.
9Throughout the paper we shall maintain the parallel interpretations of our model as describ-
ing either: (a) adult individuals who strive to maintain a certain view of the world and engage
in costly dissonance-reduction when they encounter a piece of data that does not ﬁtw i t hi t ;
or (b) a mechanism for the intergenerational transmission of beliefs and “values”, with parents
devoting time and resources to shielding their children’s belief in a just world, where eﬀort is
ultimately rewarded, from evidence that life may not be so fair after all.8
3.3 On motivated cognition
The intergenerational interpretation of our model involves only standard forms of communica-
tion (within the family, but also via schools and churches) and permits an entirely “classical”
reading of the paper. The intrapersonal interpretation corresponds to a more psychological view,
in which agents engage in a form of self-deception. There is ample evidence of such malleability
of beliefs. A ﬁrst source comes the vast literatures on cognitive dissonance, self-esteem and over-
conﬁdence, in which the role played by the selective recall or “accessibility” of past experiences
and data in maintaining valued beliefs is well documented.9 A second source is the previously
discussed work of Lerner and followers, showing how people selectively or even counterfactually
construe reality so as to preserve a just-world view. Third, recent experiments demonstrate a
similar malleability in beliefs that directly pertain to distributional issues. Thus, Kay and Jost
(2003) show that simply reading a vignette about ﬁctional (poor, rich)×(happy, unhappy) or
(poor, rich)×(honest, dishonest) characters has signiﬁcant eﬀects on subjects’ beliefs concerning
the justice of the US economic and political system. Some studies also suggest that the same
psychological mechanisms may be involved as in the repression of other unwanted thoughts.
In surveys of MBA and undergraduate students at several US universities, Jost et al. (2003)
ﬁnd subjects’ scores on a personal self-deception scale to be robust predictors of their stated
adherence to the view that the market system is fair and eﬃcient.10 Similarly, among students
in Hungary those scoring high on the self-deception scale, but not those scoring low, showed
an increased tendency to endorse the free-market system following a question critical of either
capitalism or the previous socialist regime.
Finally, Di Tella et al. (2004) exploit a rare “natural experiment”, involving an attempt by
the Argentinian government to redistribute land towards a group of very poor households, to
show how the beneﬁciaries of a pure wealth windfall responded by adopting a more pro-market
8The belief-manipulation “technology” described above, introduced in Bénabou and Tirole (2002), has been
applied in an intergenerational context by Kopczuk and Slemrod (2004) and in an intergenerational one by Dessi
(2004). An alternative approach focuses on the parental transmission of preferences (Bisin and Verdier (2000)).
9 For discussions and references, see Bénabou and Tirole (2002). More recently, the idea that people can
(imperfectly) repress or block the recall of certain memories, which had fallen out of favor together with Freudian
theory, is receiving renewed support from advances in neuroscience and brain imaging (e.g., O’Connor (2004)).
10The scale used is Paulhus’s (1984) Self-Deceptive Enhancement scale, which measures, through an anonymous
questionnaire, subjects’ unwillingness to acknowledge “shameful” but common thoughts and feelings concerning
aggression, anger, sexual fantasies, bodily functions, selﬁs h n e s s ,c r u e l t y ,e t c .
10worldview. More generally, their ﬁndings demonstrate how beliefs often adapt more to changes
in needs and goals than to changes in information.11
3.4 Eﬀort or investment decisions
We now proceed to solve the model, working backwards from the last period. Knowing the
redistributive environment he will face, each agent chooses eﬀort optimally as a function of his
beliefs concerning the expected return:
ei = aβ(1 − τ)θ(µi), where (7)
θ(µi) ≡ E[θ | Ωi
1]=µiθH +( 1− µi)θL. (8)
An agent’s policy preferences, on the other hand, depend not just on his own beliefs concerning
θ but also on his beliefs about other agents’ beliefs, as these determine the tax base from which
transfers will be ﬁnanced:
E[¯ y | Ωi
1]=¯ π + E[θ¯ e | Ωi
1]=¯ π + aβ(1 − τ)Γ(µi |λ,r),
where






¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ Ωi
1
¸
= µiθHθ(r)+( 1− µi)θL [λθL +( 1− λ)θ(r)]. (9)
Indeed, in state σ = ∅ everyone has the same posterior µj = r, whereas in state σ = L a
fraction λ of the population have µj =0and the remaining 1 − λ have µj = r, where λ is the
equilibrium awareness rate and r = r∗(λ|χ). When no confusion results, the dependence of Γ on
the equilibrium (r,λ) will be kept implicit and we shall simply write Γ(µi). The same convention
will apply to all functions derived from Γ, such as agents’ welfare levels and preferred tax rates.
Substituting (7)-(9) into (2) yields agent i’s expected utility Ui
1 a tt h et i m ee ﬀort is chosen.
Prior to that moment his preferences are the same, except that the cost of eﬀort is not yet
magniﬁed by the salience parameter 1/β. Deﬁning
V (τ,πi,µ i ) ≡ (1 − τ)
£
πi + aβ(1 − τ)θ(µi)2¤
+τ
£





(1 − τ)2θ(µi)2 (10)
allows us to capture ex ante (γ =1 )a sw e l la se xp o s t(γ = β) preferences, thus covering both
the case where voters use tax policy to remedy the time-consistency problem (γ =1 )and that
11Di Tella et al. (2004) study 313 households who had been squatting land outside Buenos Aires for 10 to 16
years when about half of them received property rights to the land, with the selection being essentially random
due to the combined vagaries of the judicial and political processes. This “treatment group” showed signiﬁcant
increases, compared to their less lucky neighbors, in beliefs that one can succeed on one’s own, that money is
important for happiness, and that others can be trusted. There was, however, no signiﬁcant increase in the belief
that people who put in eﬀort end up better than those who do not, which seems at odds with the ﬁrst result.
11where they do not (γ = β), for instance because τ and ei are chosen simultaneously.12
3.5 Social status, beliefs, and political attitudes
Assuming for the moment an interior optimum, agents i’s ideal tax rate is given by the solution
to ∂V i(τ,πi,µ i )/∂τ =0 , namely
T(πi,µ i ) ≡ 1 −
1+
¡






2 − (2 − β/γ)θ(µi)2/Γ(µi)
. (11)
This expression embodies three intuitive eﬀects. First, in the numerator, a lower relative
endowment πi−¯ π predictably increases the desired tax rate. Whether progressive or regressive,
such redistributive goals must be traded oﬀ against distortions to the eﬀort-elastic component
of the tax base, which is proportional to Γ(µi) and thus becomes more of a concern when
eﬀort is expected to productive. Second, and most important, the denominator of (11) shows
how subjective prospects of upward mobility (POUM) reduce the desired tax rate: an optimistic
individual plans on working hard and thus expects to move up in the income distribution, relative
to low-eﬀort pessimists.13 This is most apparent when πi =¯ π, in which case T decreases with
the ratio θ(µi)2/Γ(µi) between the agent’s own expected output from eﬀort and the average he
expects others to produce with their labor. This ratio is higher for an optimist (µi = r) than for
a pessimist (µi =0 ) , implying that the former desires less redistribution. The last determinant
of T relates to time preference: when agents use ﬁscal policy to correct for the suboptimality of
eﬀort (γ =1 ) ,Tis lower (perhaps even negative, representing a subsidy to labor supply) than
when they do not (γ = β).14
The following conditions ensure that voters’ preferences over τ are single-peaked and that,
as the poor become more optimistic about the return to eﬀort, the combination of the POUM
eﬀect and increased concern about tax distortions reduces their desired level or redistribution.
Assumption 1 Let: (i) ∆θ/θL < 2β/γ and (ii) (¯ π − π0)/βa < θ2
L.
In equilibrium, agents are either pessimists (µi =0 )or optimists (µi = r), depending on
their recollected signal. Accordingly, we deﬁne the functions
Tpess(π) ≡ T(π,0) and Topt(π) ≡ T(π,r). (12)
12For simplicity (and probably realism) we assume that voters do not condition their choice of τ on turning out
to be pivotal (as they do in Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1997)).
13See Bénabou and Ok (2001) for an analysis of the POUM eﬀect in the context of exogenous, known mobility
processes, and Alesina and La Ferrara (2001) for empirical evidence of its importance in determining voters’
attitudes towards redistribution. Note that T(·) also depends, through Γ(·), on the equilibrium (λ,r). We shall
again leave this dependence implicit when no confusion results.
14Both this third eﬀect and that of relative endowments are best seen when there is no heterogeneity in beliefs:
if θL = θH = ¯ θ, implying Γ(µ)=θ(µ)
2 = ¯ θ
2 for all µ, then T(π
i) ≡ 1 − (γ/β)[1+

π




12Proposition 1 Under Assumption 1, each agent’s preferences V (τ,πi,µ i ) are strictly concave
in τ and his ideal policy is τi = Tpess(πi) when he is aware of an adverse signal (ˆ σi = L),
and Topt(πi) when he is not (ˆ σi = ∅). These preferred tax rates are decreasing in the initial
endowment πi and ordered as follows:
Topt(π1) ≤ Topt(π0) <T pess(π0) < 1,
with strict inequality when π0 <π 1. Moreover, Topt(π1) < 0 and, if (¯ π − π0)/βa > (1 − β/γ)θ2
L,
then Tpess(π0) > 0.
These results are in line with empirical studies such as Fong (2001) and Alesina and La
Ferrara (2001), which show that beliefs in self-determination reduce individuals’ demand for
redistribution15 and that both believers and skeptics are found in every social class.
We next consider how these political preferences are aggregated through voting. In the no-
information state of the world, σ = ∅, things are quite simple: everyone has posterior µ = r,
so with the poor forming a majority the equilibrium tax outcome is Topt(π0). Consider now the
informative state of the world, σ = L. By Proposition 1, the pessimistic poor always want the
highest tax rate, Tpess(π0). If the equilibrium awareness rate λ is high enough that (1−ϕ)λ>1/2,
they will be a majority and impose their choice. When (1−ϕ)λ<1/2, on the other hand, some
group with less extreme preferences will be pivotal. Two cases may occur.
Case 1: if Tpess(π1) ≤ Topt(π0), then max{Tpess(π1),T opt(π1)} <T opt(π0) <T pess(π0). Since
individuals with π = π0 are a majority the pivotal group is now that of the optimistic poor, who
set the tax rate Topt(π0).
Case 2: if Tpess(π1) >T opt(π0), then Topt(π1) <T opt(π0) <T pess(π1) <T pess(π0). If λ<1/2
the optimists (rich plus poor) constitute a majority, so the pivotal group is again the optimistic
poor and the tax rate Topt(π0). If λ>1/2, on the other hand, the pivotal group is that of the
pessimistic rich, who set the tax rate Tpess(π1).
Corollary 1 As λ falls below λ∗ ≡ 1/[2(1 − ϕ)] ∈ (1/2,1), the pivotal vote switches from the
pessimistic poor to a group that desires a lower tax rate.
This result is illustrated by the “Political Equilibrium” locus on Figure 4. Of course each
agent’s awareness rate is endogenous, resulting from his (or his parents’) previous ideological
choices. We now turn to the determination of these motivated beliefs.
15Strictly speaking, the proposition shows this result only for the poor (π = π0), who are the majority group.
Under additional conditions one can ensure it for the rich (π = π1) as well, but this is not required for our analysis.
Note also that, by introducing a public good, one could ensure that tax rates are always positive.
133.6 Ideology as a cognitive investment
Consider now agent i’s decision problem at t =0 . Given the informational structure, the only
state in which he has a choice with respect to his own or his oﬀspring’s worldview is when
σi = L. Is it better to acknowledge the bad news, or to try and maintain an optimistic outlook?
An individual who ends up with belief µi will exert eﬀort ei = βa(1 − τ)θ(µi), where τ is the
tax rate that will predictably emerge from the majority vote, given the cognitive strategy (λ,r)
played by everyone else. Substituting into (2), his (ex-ante) intertemporal utility if he ends up
with belief µi will be
Ui
0 =( 1− τ)πi + τ¯ π + aβτ(1 − τ)θL [λθL +( 1− λ)θ(r)] + ˜ UL(τ,µi ), (13)
where





Several points are worth noting. First, the agent’s forecast of aggregate output in (13) reﬂects
the predicted return to eﬀort θL and belief distribution (λ,1−λ) based on the true σ = L; it is
thus independent of µi, in contrast to his prediction of ¯ y at t =1 . Similarly, the agent recognizes
that while his eﬀort will be based on a possibly diﬀerent belief µi, its productivity will still be
θL; see (14). Finally, at t =0the eﬀort cost is not subject to the salience-of-the present eﬀect.
An individual who recalls ˆ σi = L will have µi =0 , whereas for ˆ σi = ∅ he will have µi = r.

























where M(λ0) is the cost of achieving a rate of recall or intergenerational transmission equal to
λ0, as discussed in Section 3.2. Two key eﬀects are apparent in this expression:
• T h er o l eo ft i m ei n c o n s i s t e n c y :let M ≡ 0. When β ≈ 1, agents always choose λ0 =1 :
information is always valuable. Conversely, when β ≈ 0 they always choose λ0 =0 , reﬂecting
the fact that sustaining motivation is critical.16
• T h er o l eo ft a x e s :assume that β is low enough that dissonance reduction is valuable, but now
also costly (M0 > 0). Then, the lower is τ,the greater is each individual or parent’s incentive to
invest in a just-world ideology —that is, to choose a low λ0. This general-equilibrium feedback is
a source of endogenous complementarity between individual’s ideological choices.
To simplify the problem, we shall take the awareness-cost function to be piecewise linear,
with natural (costless) rate of recall ¯ λ ≤ 1, a minimum rate of recall λ < ¯ λ (or maximum degree
of repression 1 − λ), and linear marginal costs m>0 and m0 > 0 for information suppression
and rehearsal respectively; see Figure 3b.
16Both claims follow from the fact that the term multiplying λ













Figure 4: Ideological choices, political choices, and the set of equilibria (BJW: Belief in a Just World;
RP: Realistic Pessimism).
Assumption 2 The memory cost function is given by M(λ)=+ ∞ for λ<λ ,M (λ)=m(¯ λ−λ)
for λ ∈ [λ, ¯ λ] and M(λ)=m0(λ − ¯ λ) for λ ≥ ¯ λ, where 0 ≤ λ < ¯ λ ≤ 1.
With this speciﬁcation, the solution to (15) is “bang-bang”: the optimal awareness rate is
either λ or ¯ λ,17 depending on whether τ is above or below some (easily computed) threshold τ∗.
This is illustrated by the “Motivated Beliefs” locus on Figure 4.
4 American “Belief in a Just World” vs. European “Pessimism”
“I have never met in America a citizen so poor as not to cast a glance of hope and envy on the
enjoyments of the rich or whose imagination did not possess itself by anticipation of those good
things that fate still obstinately withheld from him.” (De Tocqueville, (1835)).
4.1 Equilibrium outcomes
A politico-economic equilibrium is a triple (λ,r,τ) such that, in state L,
λ ∈ arg max
λ0∈[0,1]
n





q + χ(1 − q)(1 − λ)
, (17)
τ : is the majority tax rate, given the distribution of beliefs induced by (λ,r), (18)
a n di ns t a t eσ = ∅ the majority tax rate is Topt(π0), given by (11)-(12) as a function of (λ,r).
17In general, it could also be 1 > ¯ λ . This case (rehearsing bad news) will be ruled out later on, however.
15Under conditions that we shall identify, the political and the psychological mechanisms em-
bodied in these equations and illustrated on Figure 4 give rise two equilibria —one broadly
descriptive of Western Europe, the other of the United States.
1. Realistic Pessimism / Welfare State. When agents have a high recall rate (λ = ¯ λ>λ ∗),
enough of the poor end up with pessimistic beliefs µi =0to constitute a majority and impose a
high tax rate, ¯ τ. The expectation of substantial redistribution (¯ τ>τ ∗) and therefore a low net
return to eﬀort, in turn, generates only weak incentives to deny that θ is low. So agents indeed
make no eﬀort at dissonance reduction, choosing the natural awareness rate ¯ λ.
2. Belief in a Just World / Laissez Faire. When agents try hard to ignore discouraging
news about the eﬃcacy of individual eﬀort (λ = λ <λ ∗), enough people end up with relatively
optimistic beliefs µi =¯ r to make the poor among them the pivotal group: 1 − λ > 1/2.18
The expectation of a relatively low tax rate (τ <τ ∗), in turn, generates strong incentives to
believe that θ is high. So people indeed make signiﬁcant eﬀorts at maintaining such a worldview,
implying that a high fraction 1 − ¯ λ of them do forget the dissonant information, or minimize it
to their children.
In what follows we formally establish the existence of the BJW and RP equilibria.19 Readers
who wish to skip this step may go directly to the next subsection.
We start from the parameters ¯ λ and λ of the awareness technology in Assumption 2, then
deﬁne r ≡ r∗(λ;χ) and ¯ r = r∗(¯ λ;χ) from the updating rule (17), and θ(r) and θ (¯ r) from (8).
Assumption 3 Let: (i) λ < 1/2 < (1 − ϕ)¯ λ and (ii) (1 − λr)/[1 + r(∆θ/2θL)] ≤ β/γ.
The ﬁrst condition ensures that the pivotal group switches from the pessimistic poor to the
optimistic poor as λ declines from ¯ λ to λ. The second one (which is automatically satisﬁed when
γ = β) will be used below. Next, we use (11) to compute
¯ τ ≡ Tpess(π0 |¯ λ, ¯ r)=T(π0 ,0|¯ λ, ¯ r), (19)
τ ≡ Topt(π0 |λ,r)=T(π0,r|λ,r), (20)
making here explicit the dependence of an agent’s preferred policy on the beliefs of others
(through Γ(µi |λ,r); see (9)). A ﬁrst issue is whether it is indeed the case that τ < ¯ τ. This is
far from obvious, since knowing that others are likely to be more optimistic (due to their using
the recall strategy λ rather than ¯ λ), and therefore to work harder, tends to make poor agents
want to tax more. We show, however, that this tax-base eﬀect is dominated (comparing across
potential equilibria) by their concerns over tax distortions and their own mobility prospects.
18Allowing for the possibility that the pessimistic rich may instead become pivotal (by assuming only (1−ϕ)λ <
1/2) would not change the main results, since this group also wants less redistribution than the pessimistic poor.
Letting λ < 1/2 reduces the number of cases to consider and yields other desirable properties, discussed below.
19In addition to these extremal equilibria, there may also be an (unstable) equilibrium where the ﬁrst-order
condition for (17) holds with equality at some λ ∈ (λ, ¯ λ).
16Proposition 2 Under Assumption 3(ii), the tax rates deﬁned by (19)-(20) are such that τ < ¯ τ.
The last requirement for multiplicity is that the incentive to forget or repress bad news about
θ, net of the cost required, be positive in a low-tax environment but negative in a high-tax one:
˜ UL(¯ τ,¯ r) − ˜ UL(¯ τ,0) <m<˜ UL(τ,r) − ˜ UL(τ,0). (21)
If ¯ λ<1, it must also be that no one wants to rehearse bad news (to avoid overconﬁdence):
˜ UL(¯ τ,0) − ˜ UL(¯ τ,¯ r) <m 0, (22)
while the analogue of (22) for (λ,r) follows from (21). Clearly, if
max
n
˜ UL(¯ τ,¯ r) − ˜ UL(¯ τ,0),0
o
< ˜ UL(τ,r) − ˜ UL(τ,0), (23)
the ﬁxed-point conditions given by (21) will be satisﬁed for all m>0 in the appropriate range.
Assumption 4, given in the appendix, provides conditions on the model’s parameters that are
suﬃcient for (22)-(23) to hold, leading to our main result.
Proposition 3 Let Assumptions 1—4 be satisﬁed. For a range of values of the denial cost m
(and for all m0 > 0), there exist two politico-economic equilibria, such that:
1) Agent’s awareness rate in the informative state (σ = L) is λ in the BJW equilibrium and ¯ λ
in the RP equilibrium, with associated tax rates τ and ¯ τ, such that λ < ¯ λ and τ < ¯ τ. Average
eﬀort and output are higher in the BJW equilibrium.
2) In the no-information state (σ = ∅) the rankings of tax rates, eﬀort and output across the
two equilibria depend on parameters. If π1 − π0 and χ are small enough, in particular, there
exist values of λ and ¯ λ such that these rankings remain the same as in the informative state.
4.2 Implications and robustness
1. Ideology, redistribution, and national income. Our central results pertain to the state of the
world in which agents actually receive a signal, namely here the not-so-just world (σ = L). This
is the most relevant one, as only then are individ u a l sf a c e dw i t ha na c t u a lc o g n i t i v ed e c i s i o n ,
allowing in particular the key issue of dissonance reduction to arise. (The state σ = ∅ is
discussed below, however). Proposition 3 shows that both awareness and redistribution are then
lower in the BJW equilibrium than in its RP counterpart. This endogenously shared “American
Dream” ideology has several important implications. On the macroeconomic side, it results in
higher aggregate eﬀort and output, both because agents are more optimistic about the (pretax)
return to eﬀort and because they face lower tax rates than in the “European” equilibrium. On
t h ew e l f a r es i d e ,i ti m p r o v e sa g e n t s ’e ﬀort motivation (or time-inconsistency problem) and causes
less distortions to the tax base; it also leads them to incur greater cognitive costs, however, which
17reduces these gains.20 Its net value to the poor is much more ambiguous, since they receive less
transfers and, as explained below, are more likely to be stigmatized.
2. Social mobility and savings. As mentioned in the introduction, the widespread perception
(especially in the United States itself) of the American society as exceptionally mobile is notably
at odds with the empirical evidence: comparative studies of intergenerational mobility show, on
average, no signiﬁcant diﬀerence with European countries. Our model is consistent with these
ﬁndings. In any equilibrium (λ,r) and state σ ∈ {L,∅}, the transition matrix between the
advantaged / disadvantaged and the economic success / failure social classes is
Mσ(λ,r) ≡
"
1 − π0 − Φσ(τ |λ,r) π0 + Φσ(τ |λ,r)
1 − π1 − Φσ(τ |λ,r) π1 + Φσ(τ |λ,r)
#
, (24)
with ΦL(τ |λ,r) ≡ aβ(1−τ)θL [λθL +( 1− λ)θ(r)] and ΦH(τ |λ,r) ≡ aβ(1−τ)θHθ(r).I ti se a s y
to check that the eigenvalues are always 1 and π1 − π0, implying that standard measures of
mobility are independent of (σ,τ,λ,r).21 This invariance of relative mobility may be contrasted
to the ranking of absolute mobility, namely the probability of achieving yi =1rather than
yi =0 , which is both truly higher, as people work harder, and overestimated (as fewer agents
are aware that σ = L) in the US-type equilibrium.
Finally, while our model does not explicitly have agents investing in ﬁnancial assets (in
addition to human capital, which is one possible interpretation of ei) it is clear that, with such
an extension, the steeper lifetime earnings proﬁle which they anticipate (in part, correctly) would
lead them to save less in the BJW than in the RP equilibrium. In addition to trans-Atlantic
diﬀerences in policy, labor supply and per capita income, our model can thus also shed some
light on the lower American savings rate.
3. Sophistication or naivete? In a world where people receive no signal (σ = ∅), the ranking
of tax rates across equilibria is generally less clear. This ambiguity is due to the “rational skepti-
cism” of Bayesian agents, who are aware of their own (or their parents’) systematic tendency to
censor bad news. The lower the probability λ with which such news are transmitted, the lower
their posterior conﬁdence r∗(λ;χ) that none were indeed received. Thus, voters’ expectations
of their own productivity θ(r) and the product of others’ eﬀorts Γ(r) are now lower in the BJW
equilibrium (λ = λ) than in its RP counterpart (λ = ¯ λ). This eﬀect vanishes in the limit as
χ → 0:when agents “forget that they forget”, r =¯ r =1 ; tax rates following σ = ∅ then ex-
20The ex-ante welfare calculus is more complex, and the outcome generally ambiguous. In state σ = L,
agents’ greater optimism and the lower tax rate under the BJW equilibrium lead to a net welfare gain, for
the two reasons mentioned above. In state σ = ∅, however, the Bayesian “self-doubt” eﬀect discussed below
may (see Proposition 3) result in lower eﬀort in the BJW equilibrium, and this is particularly costly since
E [θ|σ = ∅]=θH >θ L = E [θ|σ = L]. T h en e tw e l f a r eo u t c o m et h u sd e p e n d s on parameters, and in particular
on agents’ degree of Bayesian sophistication, χ.
21Cross-sectional inequality, by contrast, does vary with the equilibrium and the realized state, but in a non-
m o n o t o n i cw a y ,a si ti sp r o p o r t i o n a lt o[¯ π + Φσ(τ |λ,r)][1 − ¯ π − Φσ(τ |λ,r)].
18actly coincide in the two equilibria, and the overall correlation structure is entirely determined
by what happens when σ = L.22 When χ>0, the eﬀect on the equilibrium of doubting one’s
recall (or parents) may go either way, but one can identify suﬃcient conditions (such as those
in the proposition) for the results to remain the same as in the informative state.23
4. Who is “right”? It is worth emphasizing here that neither the model’s message nor the
source of its results is that “Americans” have a less accurate vision of economic mobility than
“Europeans”. What really matters is that their worldview (in the state of the world where
t h e r ei si n f o r m a t i o n )b em o r eoptimistic —whether rightly or wrongly. Indeed, instead of σ ∈
{L,∅}, assume now that “no news are bad news”: σ ∈ {H,∅}. Agents’ cognitive decision in the
informed state σ = H is then how much to invest in reminding themselves, and conveying to
their children, that the world is just (which it is). There will be more investments of that type
(raising λ above ¯ λ) in the US-like equilibrium than in the European one, and this again will be
mutually sustaining with lower redistribution.
5. Learning from taxes? One may worry that sophisticated agents could infer from the
realized tax rate which state of the world they are in, thus defeating the purpose of their
investing in “the American dream”. Note ﬁr s tt h a tw i t hλ < 1/2, the BJW tax rate is the same
in both states (τ = T(π0,r|λ,r)) and thus uninformative. In the RP equilibrium it diﬀers across
states, but since agents are not investing in beliefs (λ = ¯ λ) no cognitive decisions are aﬀected.
If we let ¯ λ =1 , this additional source of information is irrelevant for eﬀort and voting as well. A
more important and general point is that any information agents might retrieve about θ (e.g.,
from observing output realizations, the fact that opinions diﬀer, or the political choices of other
countries) is of the very same type as the original signal σ (and in our simple model, perfectly
correlated with it), so that they have exactly the same incentives to forget or deny it as they
had for σ.
4.3 Technological change and ideological shifts
Suppose that the value of success increases: in (1), the payoﬀ becomes X>1, capturing for
instance the rise in the returns to college education over the last 25 years. What are the
implications for redistributive policy and equilibrium ideology?
Such a skill-biased technological shift has two eﬀects, illustrated on Figure 5. First, the equi-
librium policy locus shifts down. Indeed, as X rises everyone increases their eﬀort in proportion,
ei = aXβ(1 − τ)θ(µi); each voter’s ideal tax rate is thus given by the same formula as in (11),
but with a n o ws c a l e du pt oaX. Over the relevant range where the poor (whether optimistic
22Note also that, with naive agents (χ → 0) the state σ = ∅ could occur with probability q arbitrarily close to
zero.
23As shown by (11), T(π0,r|λ,r) depends negatively on (¯ π − π0)/Γ(r) through the tax base eﬀect and on
θ(r)/Γ(r) through the POUM eﬀect. The ﬁrst force tends to make T decline with r, but becomes small when










Figure 5: Skill-biased technological progress and induced ideological shifts
or pessimistic) are pivotal, this implies lower taxes rates. Note, however that the critical value
λ∗ ≡ 1/[2(1 − ϕ)] remains invariant.
Second, and more interestingly, the motivated-beliefs locus shifts up. Indeed, a proper
motivation to study, work hard, etc., becomes more valuable, making “positive” beliefs in a
just world and individual autonomy even more functional than before. Formally, the cognitive

























Thus, all economic payoﬀsa r es i m p l ys c a l e du pb yX2,r e ﬂecting both the direct productivity
eﬀe c ta n dt h ee ﬀort response. Equivalently, cognitive costs (the function M)a r es c a l e dd o w n
by X2.A sar e s u l t ,t h eo p t i m a lλ decreases for any given τ,as shown on Figure 5; furthermore,
this shift is larger than that of the other curve (as can be seen from (25) and (11)).
Putting both eﬀects together yields the most interesting point. Whereas, by itself, a rise in
X, such as a higher skill premium, would lead only to a relatively small decline in redistribution
in each equilibrium, when ideology is endogenous it can trigger a substantial shift in beliefs about
the dependence of success on personal eﬀort —even though θ has not changed at all! This, in turn,
can cause the RP-Welfare State equilibrium to become unsustainable, leaving only the BJW-
Laissez Faire outcome. This result may help understand why, in many industrialized countries,
the widening of income inequality due to skill-biased technological change and international
trade has been accompanied by signiﬁcant attitudinal shifts towards greater individualism and
a retrenchment of redistributive policies.24
24Other models where skill-biased technical change can undermine —through very diﬀerent channels that do not
204.4 The lazy poor
Suppose now that a fraction x of the population are “lazy”, by which we mean that they have
no willpower with respect to eﬀort β =0 .25 We assume for simplicity that “laziness” and the
initial endowment π ∈ {π0,π1} are uncorrelated and that x is small enough that the presence of
these agents does not aﬀect any of the political equilibria constructed before (or perhaps they
do not even vote).
Suppose now that an agent i observes a person j who has failed (economically) in life, that
is, who has ex-post income yj =0 . What kind of attributions for failure will i then make, and
how do they depend on his chosen ideology? Given a posterior belief µi that eﬀort pays, agent
i assesses the probability that someone’s poverty is due to laziness as:
pi ≡ Pr
£




(1 − ¯ π)x
(1 − ¯ π)x +( 1− x)[(1− ¯ π − aβ(1 − τ)Γ(µi)]
. (26)
Focussing again on the informative state of the world (σ = L), we see that pi tends to be higher
in the BJW than in the RP equilibrium, for two reasons. First, the net-of-tax rate 1−τ is higher,
implying a greater incentive to work for any non-lazy person; this tends to make people view
those with yj =0as less likely to have worked. Second, with λ < 1/2 the majority of agents
in the BJW equilibrium are optimists, whose estimate of the average contribution of eﬀort to
success is higher than that of the pessimists who constitute a majority in the RP equilibrium
(Γ(r) > Γ(0)).
T h e r ei st h u sag r e a t e rp r e v a l e n c eo fs t i g m aon the (ex-post) poor in a BJW equilibrium,
especially among the politically pivotal classes. This prediction is in line with the international
survey evidence cited in the introduction (e.g., Alesina et al. (2001)), the ethnographic interviews
conducted by Lamont (2000) in the United Sates and France, and Gilens’ (1999) study of
American’s perceptions of welfare recipients. The negative inference attached to poverty is
likely to trigger emotional reactions such as resentment, anger, etc. Furthermore, there is strong
evidence that people are selectively altruistic or empathic, in the sense that they want to help
only “those who help themselves”, namely the non-lazy poor (e.g. Fong (2001), Kangas (2003),
Bowles et al. (2005)). Incorporating such social preferences into the model would thus clearly
imply that the BJW-induced stigma will translate into lower transfers.26,27
involve ideology— the sustainability of the Welfare State include Hassler et al. (2003) and Bénabou (2004).
25A formally equivalent assumption would be that they have a prohibitively high cost of eﬀort, 1/a =+ ∞.
This however, does not correspond nearly as well to the common understanding of “laziness”.
26For a model of redistribution with a related type of preference for fairness, see Alesina and Angeletos (2005).
In the US context, a central role in the stigma associated with poverty and welfare recipiency is also played by
racial stereotypes (Gilens (1999), Alesina et al. (2001)), a phenomenon from which we abstract here.
27A related mechanism arises when agents do not know the fraction x of the population who are lazy. They
will then make inferences about it from the observed poverty rate, together with their own beliefs about θ. If
the pivotal group maintains a BJW ideology (ˆ σ = ∅), they will compute a higher estimate of x than if they are
“pessimists” (ˆ σ = L). They will then provide less transfers to those who failed, and the resulting lower required
tax rate will again increase the incentive to maintain a Just-World outlook.
214.5 Propaganda
Our model is one where agents only inﬂuence their own and their children’s beliefs, yet it also
provides insights into society-wide propaganda and even an initial framework for a model of this
phenomenon.
The pervasiveness of American-dream, land-of-opportunity “boosterism” in the media, edu-
cation and culture of the United States throughout its history has been documented by many
authors, most recently Hochschild (1996) and Alesina and Glaeser (2004). The latter also point
t ot h ec o n v e r s er o l ep l a y e db yu n i o n sa n dt h ee ducational system in the dissemination of so-
cialist ideas in Europe, to which one may add the inﬂuence of prominent “public intellectuals”.
At the same time, one can not simply view public beliefs as passively molded by a top-down
supply of propaganda, as in the traditional Marxist explanation for American workers’ “false
consciousness”. First, as seen earlier, this does not match the ethnographic evidence. Second,
examples like the Soviet Union make clear that even a monopolistic, omnipresent stream of
propaganda cannot durably sway minds in the face of a contradictory reality. This is a fortiori
true in democratic, well-informed societies. For propaganda to work eﬀectively, people must
be receptive to it —it must serve some “need” that they consciously or unconsciously perceive.
Indeed the puzzle in the historical US-Europe contrast has always been why Americans proved
less amenable to socialist or populist doctrine than Europeans, and the latter less amenable to
pro-market doctrine. A theory of political propaganda, like a theory of advertising or a theory
of religion, should include the “demand side”. Our model can be thought of in those terms, with
the supply exogenously ﬁxed.
Let us think, for instance, of “unjust-world” signals (σ = L) being periodically received
by certain segments of society, and then systematically relayed to the whole population by
left-wing parties or unions. The model then explains why, in a US-type BJW equilibrium,
people would not want to listen to such messages, would try to dismiss them, keep them out of
schools, etc., whereas in a European-type RP equilibrium they would be much more receptive.
Conversely, if there periodically occur signals favorable to markets and individualism (σ = H,
as discussed in the previous section), right-wing parties seeking to disseminate them would ﬁnd
an audience much more willing to listen to, rehearse and celebrate these stories in the US-type
equilibrium than in the other. Given such diﬀerential returns to left- and right-wing propaganda,
even a symmetric supply mechanism (and a fortiori one where the incumbent side had greater
resources) would lead to a trans-Atlantic polarization of the dominant discourses.
Our model is also consistent with the evidence presented by Alesina and Glaeser (2004)
in support of the view that it is political institutions (or their exogenous determinants) that
drive ideology, while at the same time showing that this is perfectly compatible —and even
complementary— with a reverse causal mechanism, from ideology to political outcomes. These
authors ﬁrst argue, based on political-economy arguments, that factors such as a majoritarian
(rather than proportional) representation system, an ethnically heterogeneous population or a
22larger land area make it easier for the right to be in power and block redistribution. They then
show that in countries with such characteristics, larger fractions of the population indeed believe
that individual eﬀort determines economic outcomes, or that the poor are lazy. Taking as given
that the above factors create a bias in the “political technology” in favor of the right, this is
also what our model predicts. On Figure 5, an exogenous downward shift in the equilibrium tax
locus (or, equivalently, a leftward shift in the critical λ∗, such as results from a political disen-
franchisement of some of the poor, or an overrepresentation of the rich) typically leads to a shift
in equilibrium beliefs that —depending on the initial conﬁguration— makes a BJW equilibrium
appear where previously there was only the RP one, or makes the RP one disappear when both
existed. Note also that, as with skill-biased technological progress, this endogenous response of
ideology (coming about through any combination of individual cognitive investments or changed
receptivity to propaganda) is a much more important contributor to the ﬁnal diﬀerence in policy
than the initial exogenous variation.
5 Culture and religion as collective beliefs
5.1 Consumerist versus leisure-oriented societies
The model can also shed light on attitudinal diﬀerences, both within and across countries, con-
cerning the degree to which “money buys happiness” —meaning the extent to which consumption
of material goods, rather than leisure and related non-market activities, generates lasting in-
creases in wellbeing. Indeed it is a common view that, in modern societies, people excessively
value material consumptions relative to “relational” ones such as family, friends, community
service, etc. (e.g., Putnam (2000), Frank (2000)). Psychologists, in particular, point to phe-
nomena such as the “hedonic treadmill” and people’s general tendency to underestimate the
speed at which their level of wellbeing will revert to a baseline level following both favorable
and unfavorable life events. (Gilbert et al. (1998), Kahneman (2000)). While such “adaptation”
has been found to operate on both changes in material consumption (income, wealth, tenure)
and relational ones (marriage, divorce, etc.), the claim is often made that the failure of aﬀective
forecasting operates diﬀerentially, leading to a bias towards material or status goods at the
expense of relational ones or self-development (e.g., Frey and Stutzer (2003)). Why it should be
so, however, is typically not explained; we provide here a simple motivated-beliefs theory of this
phenomenon.28
Consider the same model as before, but replacing θ in the production function (1) by a ﬁxed,
known return. Now, however, income yi is an argument of a standard (indirect) utility function,
28Loewenstein, Rabin and O’Donoghue (2003) explore the implications of “projection bias” (consumers’ failure
to fully anticipate changes in their preferences) for several important issues such as the endowment eﬀect, durable
goods purchases and addiction. On the other hand, the myopic forecasting rule followed by individuals in their
model is assumed a priori, and taken to apply equally to all sources of utility.



















where θ is an imperfectly known preference parameter negatively related to the speed of hedonic
adaptation and P a known price deﬂator: terms of trade, index of product variety or quality, etc.
For simplicity, we abstract here from diﬀerences in initial endowments: π0 = π1. Redistributive
concerns will nonetheless remain operative, due to agents’ diﬀerent perceived mobility prospects.
This model is clearly isomorphic to the previous one (with common πi’s), so under conditions
very similar to those of Proposition 3 there are again two equilibria:
1. A consumerist and laissez-faire equilibrium: a large fraction of the population believes
that consumption is an important key to happiness. Consequently, they opt for high levels of
eﬀort and vote for low levels of redistribution, as they do not want their labor to subsidize the
more leisure-oriented pessimistic agents. Low redistribution, in turn, increases the incentives to
believe and teach to one’s oﬀspring that the (now predictable) fruits of eﬀort will translate into
lasting improvements in well-being.
2. A leisure-oriented and redistributive equilibrium: the mechanism works in reverse here,
with a majority or pivotal group holding more skeptical views about the value of “materialistic”
pursuits and opting instead for leisure, family and social life, etc. Individuals in such societies
work less both because of their diﬀerent attitudes toward what makes one happy and because
of the (endogenously) higher taxes that they face.
Thus, along these more “cultural” dimensions as well, our model ﬁts the major dichotomy
observed between the United States and Western European societies. The previous section’s
comparative statics results also carry over. In particular, an increase in productivity or in the
terms of trade X =1 /P can trigger a massive shift from “traditional values” (communal or
village life, extended families, social interactions, etc.) to a more atomistic (“bowling alone”)
and mass-consumption society. On the welfare side, materialistic beliefs are a mixed blessing,
helping individuals to overcome their tendency to underprovide eﬀort but resulting in lower than
expected levels of satisfaction.
5.2 Beliefs and aﬀect
We have so far stressed the potential usefulness of beliefs in self-determination for the pursuit of
long-term goals, using a model with conﬂicting ex-ante and ex-post preferences, whether intra-
or intergenerational. This is an important motive, widely stressed by psychologists (for instance
in the “self-eﬃcacy” and “illusion of control” literatures), and familiar to all parents. But both
psychologists (e.g., Lerner (1982)) and common observation suggest that many people also simply
24derive comfort from thinking that they live in a just world.29 Their sense of fairness may be
oﬀended if they believe personal fate to be predetermined by social origins or discrimination, or
they may ﬁnd the idea that it is essentially random and beyond one’s control anxiety-provoking.
Such aﬀective motives for just-world beliefs can easily be substituted for, or combined with, the
functional one.















where u0 > 0 and θ(µi) is deﬁned as before. In the eﬀort term, β1 = β could now equal 1, as
hyperbolic discounting is no longer needed. To demonstrate the equivalence between the two
motives for cognitive manipulations, however, we allow any β ≤ 1. In the anticipal-utility term,
the key assumption is that agents at t =1derive satisfaction from holding positive views about
the net return to eﬀort (1 −τ)θ, rather than just θ. This is more natural, as a world where θ is
high but all the fruits of eﬀort are taxed away would not be a very fair one. Together with the
political mechanism, it again leads to a complementarity between agents’ cognitive choices.
F i r s t ,t h em o r ep e o p l eb e l i e v et h a tθ is high, the lower the equilibrium τ.Indeed, the anticipal
term has no impact on eﬀort decisions (conditional on τ and µi), so voters’ utility at t =1





the preexisting tendency for an agent’s ideal tax rate τi to decline with his level of optimism µi.















where ˜ UL is still given by (14). The diﬀerence ˜ UL(τ,r) − ˜ UL(τ,0) is the previously studied
motivational incentive to manipulate awareness. Aﬀective concerns create a further incentive
u((1−τ)θ(r))−u((1−τ)θL), which also rises with 1−τ provided u is not too concave:30 the lower
the tax rate, the more satisfying it will be, at t =1 , to believe that θ is high. In particular, with

















The anticipal-utility coeﬃcient ρ thus plays essentially the same role, in determining the demand
for just-world beliefs, as the degree of time inconsistency 1 − β. In particular, even when β =1
29On may point for instance to ﬁction and movie endings —especially the prototypical “Hollywood ending”. For
an insightful discussion of “the mind as a consuming organ”, including applications to literature and the arts, see
Schelling (1988). Recent models of anticipal feelings include Caplin and Leahy (2001), Landier (2000), Köszegi
(2004) and Brunnermeier and Parker (2004).
30It suﬃces that the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion, −cu
00(c)/u
0(c), be less than 1. This includes the case
where u is linear, so our results do not depend on any nonlinear transformation of the probabilities (µi,1 − µi).
25there is a positive incentive to engage in belief manipulation (to be traded oﬀ against the marginal
cost m), as long as ρ is above some minimum value.
5.3 A simple theory of religion
The most common and powerful of form of individually chosen but collectively sustained belief
is religion. A simple extension of the model allows us to analyze individual and cross-country
diﬀerences in a speciﬁc but economically important class of religious beliefs, namely those linked
(or similar) to the “Protestant ethic”. By this we refer to a belief that there is a hereafter
in which rewards and punishments will be determined according to eﬀort and industriousness
(or lack thereof) during one’s lifetime.31 The alternative view is that there is most likely no
afterlife, or that if there is one, its rewards are determined according to criteria unrelated
to industriousness, or even antithetical to material success: vows of poverty and asceticism,
good deeds towards others, scrupulous observance of rituals, contemplation, the “extinction of
desires”, etc. Uncertainty over the likelihood or nature of divine rewards (and punishments) can
be simply modelled as follows:
a) In the production function, let θ be replaced by a ﬁxed return, α ≥ 1. Thus, everyone
agrees on the nature of economic processes (rewards in the material world).
b) Preferences involve no time-inconsistency (β =1 )but include an anticipal term for the
“value of the afterlife”, u(e,θ), about which agents are uncertain.32
Without loss of generality let u(e,θ)=θe,where θH >θ L are now the two possible (expected)














where θ(µi)=µiθH +(1−µi)θL reﬂects the strength of his religious faith at t =1 . Note that the
policy variable 1−τ no longer enters the anticipal term; yet an endogenous complementarity in
belief formation will still arise, though now through a more subtle channel:
— The more religious an individual is, the harder he works. Therefore the lower he wants
taxes to be, so as to avoid redistributing income towards less hard-working “unbelievers”. (By
31Our purpose is of course not to delve into the details of diﬀerent doctrines. We will just observe that eﬀort and
industriousness could yield rewards in the hereafter either because they are “good” per se, or because they signal
a characteristic speciﬁc to the “chosen” (see Ainslie (1992) for a discussion of this idea originating with Weber,
and Bodner and Prelec (2002) and Bénabou and Tirole (2004) for models of self-signaling). For discussions of the
literature on religion and economics see Iannaconne (1998), Guiso et al. (2002) and Noland (2003).
32We set β =1here only for simplicity and to make clear that the mechanism explored in this section does not
require any intrapersonal or intergenerational conﬂict. In fact, religion is also largely a self-discipline mechanism,
and this can easily be captured in our model, by allowing β<1. We leave this extension to future work.
33Among the types of negative signals σ = L that believers in a religion R may now receive are scientiﬁc advances
that contradict traditional teachings, immoral conduct by religious oﬃcials, personal tragedies and injustices in
the world (e.g., wars, genocides, natural disasters) that challenge one’s faith, or the fact that believers in some
other religion R
0 are more numerous or growing in numbers.
26contrast, µi no longer aﬀects the tax-distortion concern, as α is common knowledge.) Thus, a
greater proportion of religious individuals leads (over the relevant range where the pivotal vote
switches) to a lower degree of redistribution.
— Conversely, the anticipation of a low tax rate increases the value of investing in (or trans-
mitting) religious beliefs. If a person expects to work hard because of low redistribution, then
believing that eﬀort carries important rewards in the afterlife will result in high anticipatory
utility. If he expects to work little, on the other hand (because of high taxes or personal tastes)
then fervent religious beliefs are not very welfare-enhancing.
Therefore, under appropriate conditions, we can again expect two equilibria:
1. A high-religiosity / “Protestant work ethic” equilibrium, accompanied by high eﬀort and
low redistribution.
2. An equilibrium characterized by a greater predominance of agnosticism, or of religions
that do not stress industriousness and worldly achievements, accompanied by the reverse pattern
of labor supply and redistributive policy.
To highlight the role of diﬀerences in religiosity, we shall establish these results in the simple
case where there are no ex-ante disparities in endowments or social status among agents: π0 = π1
(more generally, π1 − π0 is relatively small). We also require a certain joint condition on the
exogenous parameters of the model, given in the Appendix (Assumption 5); it holds in particular
when λ and ¯ λ are close enough to 1/2.
Given the preferences (31), an agent with belief µi chooses eﬀort ei = a
£
(1 − τ)α + θ(µi)
¤
and his expectation of aggregate output is ¯ y =¯ π + a
£
(1 − τ)α + Θ(µi)
¤
, where
Θ(µi) ≡ µiθ(r)+( 1− µi)[λθL +( 1− λ)θ(r)]
is his estimate of others’ average belief in the afterlife. The resulting expected utility from a tax
rate τ is then
V (τ,µi) ≡ (a/2)
£




(1 − τ)α + Θ(µi)
¤
, (32)








Intuitively, believers expect to work hard and thus want regressive taxation (or, if that is ruled
out, laissez faire, τi =0 ) , whereas nonbelievers are in favor of progressive redistribution. With
only two classes of agents, the political equilibrium is very simple. In the no-information state
(σ = ∅), agents all share the same beliefs and the tax rate is Topt(r)=−λr(1−r)(∆θ/α) (again,
nonnegative values could be ensured by introducing a public good). In the more interesting
informative state, σ = L, there are 1−λ believers with µi = r and λ non-believers with µi =0 ;
27so, once again, the tax rate jumps up when λ exceeds a critical threshold:
τ =
(
Topt(r) ≡− λr(1 − r)(∆θ/α) < 0 if λ ≤ 2
Tpess(r) ≡ min{r(1 − λ)(∆θ/α),1} > 0 λ>1/2
. (34)
Consider now individuals’ incentives to maintain and instill in their children strong religious
beliefs (of the type that we focus on). Given a signal σ = L, the diﬀerence in expected utility
between a believer and a nonbeliever is
V (τ,r) − V (τ,0) = ar(∆θ)[(1− τ)α + θL + r(∆θ/2) + τrλ]. (35)
The important property to notice is that (since α ≥ 1) it is again increasing in 1 − τ, even
though taxes bear only on α, which is known, whereas religious beliefs are about θ.
Proposition 4 Let β =1 ,π 0 = π1 and let the productivity of eﬀort be a ﬁxed, known, α ≥ 1.
Assume also that Assumptions 2 and 5 hold. Then, for a range of values of m (and all m0 large
enough) there exist two politico-religious equilibria, such that:
1) In the informative state (σ = L), the fractions of believers are 1 − λ and 1 − ¯ λ and the tax
rates τ and ¯ τ, given by (34). Redistribution is lower, average eﬀort and output higher, in the
more religious equilibrium.
2) In the no-information state (σ = ∅), the rankings of tax rates, eﬀort and output across the
two equilibria depend on parameters. If χ is low enough, in particular, there exist values of λ
and ¯ λ such that these rankings remain the same as in the informed state.
Our model thus provides a simple theory of endogenous diﬀerences in religious beliefs, re-
solving in the process earlier discussions of whether religion can be brought within the scope of
the economics of information and of its relationship to cognitive dissonance or other forms of
belief adaptation (Montgomery (1996), Hardin (1997)). Furthermore, its predictions about the
main economic correlates of religiosity accord well with a considerable body of evidence:
—A tt h eindividual level, studies universally ﬁnd that more religious individuals, and par-
ticularly Protestants, have less favorable attitudes towards redistribution than others and are
more tolerant of inequality (e.g., Alesina et al. (2001), Guiso et al. (2001)).
—A tt h ecross-country level, Barro and Mc.Cleary (2003) ﬁnd that a country’s degree of
religiosity —more speciﬁcally, the prevalence of beliefs in an afterlife characterized by heaven or
hell— is associated with faster growth, controlling for the usual determinants (see also Noland
(2003) for related results).
Naturally, this equilibrium model of religion is excessively simple. This same simplicity,
however, makes it possible to extend it in several relevant directions. First, one could explore
channels of general-equilibrium feedback other than that of redistributive institutions, which
we have highlighted. Second, letting β<1 would allow us to capture religion’s important
28role as a self-discipline device. Third, one could allow for uncertainty over rewards both in
this world and in the next (or the latter’s existence), namely over α and θ, and examine when
these two sets of beliefs are substitutes or complements.34 Indeed, many studies ﬁnd a positive
correlation between individuals’ religiosity, particularly the Protestant ethic, and their scores
on a BJW-scale (Peplau and Tyler (1975)), which in turn are important mediators of their
opposition to redistributive policies. Similarly, using the World Values Survey and controlling
for individuals’ socioeconomic characteristics, Guiso et al.(2002) ﬁnd that being religious has
a positive association with believing that success in life depends more on hard work than on
luck and circumstances, that poverty is attributable to laziness, that some inequality is needed
to provide incentives for eﬀort, and the like. On the other hand, one notes that Scandinavian
countries share with the US a prevalence of Protestantism, but almost opposite views about the
determinants of individuals’ economic fate (Alesina and Glaeser (2004)).
6C o n c l u s i o n
Is the “American dream,” according to our theory, but myth, a self-sustaining collective illusion?
The answer is more subtle than a simple yes or no. While the “Belief in a Just World” equilibrium
does generally involve more reality distortion —overestimation of the extent to which people get
what they deserve, can go from rags to riches, or become president— it is also not just a dream,
since net incomes or rewards are truly more closely tied to merit than in a more redistributive
“Realistic Pessimism” equilibrium.35 Furthermore, this shared ideology can have important
growth and ex-ante welfare beneﬁts, including improving individuals’ motivation to eﬀort. Its
net value to the poor is much more ambiguous, since they receive less transfers and are more
likely to be stigmatized.
More generally, our model provides a theory of collective beliefs, based on endogenous com-
plementarities between individuals’ cognitive choices that arise very naturally from the interplay
of well-established psychological motives and economic rationality. This simple blueprint is ap-
plicable to a wide domain of beliefs and biases, such as pro- or anti-redistributive ideology,
consumerist versus leisurist views on happiness, and even religion, all of which were examined
here. Many others interesting ones, such as organized propaganda, seem within the reach of
further research.
34Our model already suggests channels for both complementarity and substitutability. On one hand, if an
individual expects to work hard because he believes that the worldly return to eﬀort is high, he has a greater
incentive to also believe that eﬀort will be rewarded in the next world. On the other hand, if he anticipates
working hard for religious reasons he may have (when β<1) less self-motivational need to engage in positive
thinking about the economic rewards to eﬀort. These two eﬀects could in principle produce a correlation of either
sign between ideological and religious beliefs, depending on which parameter (e.g., the need for motivation vs.
the opportunity costs of religiosity) is varied. The general-equilibrium eﬀect of redistribution on belief formation,
on the other hand, will tend to move both in the same direction.
35It should also be easy to extend the model so that even the pre-redistribution return to eﬀort is higher in the
ﬁrst equilibrium. This will occur, for instance, if agents’ eﬀorts are complements in production.
29Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. Let us ﬁrst make explicit the values of the function Γ(µi) for the
two posteriors that agent will hold in equilibrium. When ˆ σi = L, we have Γ(0) = θ2
L +( 1−
λ)θL(θ(r) − θL) >θ 2
L. When ˆ σi = ∅, we have
Γ(r)=rθHθ(r)+( 1− r)θL(λθL +( 1− λ)θ(r))
= θ(r)2 − λ(1 − r)θL [θ(r) − θL] <θ (r)2. (A.1)




(2 − β/γ)θ(µi)2 − 2Γ(µi)
¤
,
so the function V i is concave in τ if (2 − β/γ)θ(µi)2 < 2Γ(µi), meaning that:
(2 − β/γ)
¡




µiθHθ(r)+( 1− µi)θL (λθL +( 1− λ)θ(r))
¤
.
Since the diﬀerence between the left- and right-hand sides is quadratic and convex in µi,i to n l y
needs to be checked at the boundaries of the range of beliefs [0,r] achievable in equilibrium. For
µi =0we get (2 − β/γ)(θL)
2 < 2θL [λθL +( 1− λ)θ(r)], which trivially holds. For µi = r, we
require that:
(2 − β/γ)θ(r)2 ≤ 2[rθHθ(r)+( 1− r)θL(λθL +( 1− λ)θ(r))]
=2 [ ( rθH +( 1− r)θL)θ(r) − (1 − r)λθL(θ(r) − θL)]
=2
£
θ(r)2 − (1 − r)λθL(θ(r) − θL)
¤
⇐⇒
(β/γ)θ(r)2 ≥ 2r(1 − r)λθL(θH − θL).
Since r(1 − r) ≤ 1/4, this is ensured by Assumption 1(i). k
We now rank agents’ preferred tax rates, as functions of their endowments and beliefs.
2) Proof that Topt(π0) <T pess(π0):By (11), for any π we have Topt(π) <T pess(π) if and only if:
π − ¯ π + aβΓ(0)
aβ [2Γ(0) − (2 − β/γ)θ(0)2]
<
π − ¯ π + aβΓ(r)
aβ [2Γ(r) − (2 − β/γ)θ(r)2]
, (A.2)
which is equivalent to:
µ





















30Γ(r) − Γ(0) = θ(r)2 − θ2
L − λ(1 − r)θL(θ(r) − θL) − (1 − λ)θL(θ(r) − θL)
= r(∆θ)[θ(r)+θL − (1 − λr)θL]=r(∆θ)[(1+λr)θL + r(∆θ)] (A.4)
and that:
θ(r)2Γ(0) − θ(0)2Γ(r)=θLθ(r)2 [θL +( 1− λ)(θ(r) − θL)] − θ2
L
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θ(r)2 − λ(1 − r)θL (θ(r) − θL)
¤
= θL(θ(r) − θL)
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If the term in brackets on the right-hand side is negative —this always occurs, in particular,
when γ = β, the condition automatically holds for the poor, since ¯ π −π0 > 0. Assume therefore
that the said term in brackets is positive. Since (¯ π − π0)/aβ < θ2
L by Assumption 1(ii) and
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r∆θ>0 ⇐⇒ θL (1 + λr)+r∆θ>0,
hence the result. k
3) Proof that Tpess(π0) < 1:by (11), this is equivalent to
¯ π − π0
βa
< Γ(0) = θL [(1 − λ)θ(r)+λθL],
for which it is suﬃcient that ¯ π − π0 <β a θ 2
L, which is ensured by Assumption 1(ii). k
4) Proof that Topt(π1) < 0:by (11), this is equivalent to:
π1 − ¯ π
aβ
> Γ(r) − (2 − β/γ)θ(r)2 = Γ(r) − θ(r)2 − (1 − β/γ)θ(r)2,
which holds automatically since θ(r)2 > Γ(r) by (A.1). k
315) Proof that Tpess(π0) > 0, when (¯ π − π0)/aβ > (1 − β/γ)θ2
L. 1. By (11), Tpess(π0) > 0 if
π0 − ¯ π
aβ
+ Γ(0) < 2Γ(0) − (2 − β/γ)θ(0)2 ⇐⇒
¯ π − π0
aβ
>θ L [(2 − β/γ)θL − (θL +( 1− λ)r(∆θ))] ⇐⇒
¯ π − π0
aβ
>θ L [(1 − β/γ)θL − (1 − λ)r(∆θ)],
hence the result. k
6) Proof that agents i’s preferred tax rate is Tpess(πi) or Topt(πi), depending on ˆ σi = L,∅ :




.(If τ was constrained to be nonnegative,








; this would make little diﬀerence to
the results). Furthermore, we have established that: Topt(π1) ≤ Topt(π0) <T pess(π0) < 1 and
Tpess(π1) ≤ Tpess(π0),where the inequalities are strict whenever π0 <π 1. Thus Tpess(π0) is the
largest desired tax rate and the constraint τi ≤ 1 is never binding in equilibrium. ¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2 . We can write
¯ τ − τ ≡ Tpess(π0 |¯ λ, ¯ r) − Topt(π0 |λ,r)
=
π0 − ¯ π + aβΓ(r|λ,r)
aβ [2Γ(r|λ,r) − (2 − β/γ)θ(r)2]
−
π0 − ¯ π + aβΓ(0|¯ λ, ¯ r)
aβ
£
2Γ(0|¯ λ, ¯ r) − (2 − β/γ)θ(0)2¤
= Π1 +
µ







2 − (2 − β/γ)θ(r)2/Γ(r |λ,r)
−
1




2Γ(0|¯ λ, ¯ r) − (2 − β/γ)θ(0)2 −
1
2Γ(r|λ,r) − (2 − β/γ)θ(r)2. (A.8)
We now show that Π1 > 0 and, under Assumption 3(ii), Π2 > 0 .F i r s t ,Π1 > 0 i fa n do n l yi f
θ(r)2Γ(0|¯ λ, ¯ r) >θ (0)2Γ(r|λ,r) ⇐⇒
θ(r)2Γ(0|λ,r) − θ(0)2Γ(r|λ,r) >θ (r)2 £
Γ(0|λ,r) − Γ(0|¯ λ, ¯ r)
¤
.
By (A.5) and (9), this is equivalent to:
rθL (∆θ)
£


















L +(1− ¯ λ)¯ rθ(r)2 > 0, proving that Proposition 2 always holds when
π0 =¯ π = π1. Next, Π2 > 0 i fa n do n l yi f
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£
Γ(r|λ,r) − Γ(0|¯ λ, ¯ r)
¤
> (2 − β/γ)[θ(r)2 − θ(0)2] ⇐⇒
2
£




Γ(r|λ,r) − Γ(0|λ,r) −
¡
θ(r)2 − θ(0)2¢¤
+(β/γ)[θ(r)2 −θ(0)2] > 0.
Using (9) to compute the ﬁrst term and the the ﬁrst line of (A.4) for the second one, this becomes
2θL (∆θ)
£
(1 − λ)r − (1 − ¯ λ)¯ r
¤




r[λ(1 − r)+1− λ] − (1 − λ)r +( 1− ¯ λ)¯ r
ª
< (β/γ)[θ(r)2 − θ(0)2] ⇐⇒
2θL (∆θ)
£
λr(1 − r)+( 1− ¯ λ)¯ r
¤
< (β/γ)r(∆θ)[2θL + r(∆θ)].










¯ r(1 − ¯ λ) − r(1 − λ)
r[1 + r(∆θ)/(2θL)]
. (A.9)
From (17) we see that r(1 − λ) is increasing in 1 − λ, hence the last term in (A.9) is negative
and the inequality therefore holds under Assumption 3(ii). ¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3 .In addition to Assumptions 1—3, the proposition requires














We now proceed to show the claimed results.
1. Informative state (σ = L). Let us examine the incentive to repress (gross of memory costs):






= aβ(1 − τ)2 (θH − θL)r
∙












< (1 − β)θL (A.11)
(1 − ¯ τ)2¯ r
∙





< (1 − τ)2r
∙






Since (1 − ¯ τ)2 < (1 − τ)2, the second condition is satisﬁed when
33(1 − β)θL (¯ r − r) <β(∆θ)
µ
¯ r2 − r2
2
¶
⇐⇒ (1 − β)θL <β ∆θ
µ

















(¯ r + r), (A.13)
which is ensured by Assumption 4 since r ≤ ˜ r. Finally, when ¯ λ<1 we also need to check that
no agent want to rehearse bad news: ˜ UL(¯ τ,¯ r)− ˜ UL(¯ τ,0) > −m0. This condition is satisﬁed when












which is ensured by Assumption 4, since ˜ r ≡ ¯ r when ¯ λ<1. This establishes the existence of the
two equilibria. Consider now aggregate output. In an equilibrium (λ,r),
¯ yL =¯ π + aβθL(1 − τ)[θL + r(1 − λ)(∆θ)]. (A.15)
Since τ < ¯ τ and (1 − λ)r > (1 − ¯ λ)¯ r by (17), ¯ yL is always higher in the BJW equilibrium.
2. Uninformative state (σ = ∅). Recall that we focus here on the case where π1 = π0 and χ is
small (more generally, π1 − π0 << χ << 1). As χ ≈ 0,
r =
q
q + χ(1 − q)(1 − λ)


























≡ 1+χλ(1 − λ)ξ,
where the last equality deﬁnes the parameter ξ. Therefore, given π1 = π0,
1 − Topt(π0)=
1






[1 + (2γ/β − 1)χλ(1 − λ)ξ].
Therefore, we have Topt(π0 |λ,r) <T opt(π0 |¯ λ, ¯ r) i fa n do n l yi f¯ λ(1 − ¯ λ) <λ (1 − λ),which is
compatible with the other assumptions listed Proposition 3. Turning now to aggregate output,
in an equilibrium (λ,r) it is given by
¯ y∅ − ¯ π
aβθH






























































































¯ λ − 1
¸





















¶¡¯ λ + λ − 1
¢
> 1, (A.17)
which again is compatible with the other assumptions, provided we are in the case γ =1and β
is low enough. In particular, it must be below 2/3. ¥
Proof of Proposition 4 . As usual, let r and ¯ r denote the optimistic posterior beliefs associated
to awareness rates λ and ¯ λ respectively. We shall require that
Assumption 5 Let (i) λ < 1/2 < ¯ λ ≤ 1 and (ii) assume that
¯ r2 ¡




1 − ¯ λ,α/(¯ r∆θ)
ª
+ r2 (1 − λr/α)(1− r)λ





¯ r + r
2
. (A.18)
Note that when λ and ¯ λ tend towards 1/2− and 1/2+ respectively r and ¯ r tend to a common
limit r∗(1/2;χ), so the left-hand side tends towards +∞ while the right-hand side remains ﬁnite,
implying that condition is automatically satisﬁed.
We now prove the proposition. The low-recall equilibrium (λ = λ,τ = τ) exists if and only if
m<V (τ,r) − V (τ,0) = ar(∆θ)[(1− τ)α + θL + r(∆θ)/2+τ rλ], where
τ = Topt(r)=−λr(1 − r)(∆θ)/α
Similarly, the high-recall equilibrium (λ = ¯ λ,τ =¯ τ) exists if and only if
m>V (τ,¯ r) − V (τ,0) = a¯ r(∆θ)
£
(1 − ¯ τ)α + θL +¯ r(∆θ)/2+¯ τ ¯ r ¯ λ
¤
> −m0, where
¯ τ = Tpess(¯ r)=m i n
©
¯ r(1 − ¯ λ)(∆θ)/α,1
ª
.
The necessary and suﬃcient conditions for multiplicity are therefore that
¯ r
£
(1 − ¯ τ)α + θL +¯ r(∆θ)/2+¯ τ¯ r¯ λ
¤
<r[(1 − τ)α + θL + r(∆θ)/2+τ rλ], (A.19)
35and that m0 be large enough. The above condition can be rewritten as
(¯ r − r)[α + θL +( ∆θ)(¯ r + r)/2] < ¯ r ¯ τ
¡
α − ¯ λ¯ r
¢
− rτ (α − λr).
Substituting in ¯ τ and τ yields the result, by Assumption 5(ii). Next, note that output in state
σ = L equals
¯ yL =¯ π + a[(1 − τ)α + θL +( 1− λ)r(∆θ)].
Since τ < ¯ τ and (1 − λ)r > (1 − ¯ λ)¯ r by (17), ¯ yL is higher in the more religious equilibrium.
Consider now the no-information state, in which agents’ uniformly shared beliefs are θ(r)
and θ(¯ r) respectively, with θ(r) <θ (¯ r), while taxes are Topt(r) and Topt(¯ r). Since Topt(r)=
−λr(1 − r)(∆θ)/α, (A.16) implies that when χ is small taxes in state σ = ∅ are also lower
under the more religious equilibrium if ¯ λ(1 − ¯ λ) <λ (1 − λ). Note that this is compatible with
the other assumptions in Proposition 4; in particular, Assumption 5 is automatically satisﬁed
when χ is small enough, as both ¯ r and r tend to 1. Turning ﬁnally to output, it equals
¯ y∅ =¯ π + a[(1 − τ)α + θL + r(∆θ)], (A.20)
so it is higher in the (λ, ¯ λ) equilibrium if and only if (¯ r − r)(∆θ/α) <T opt(¯ r) − Topt(r)=
[¯ r(1 − ¯ r) − r(1 − r)](∆θ/α), or ¯ r+r > 2, which is also satisﬁed when χ is close enough to 0. ¥
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